What Democracy in Venezuela Would Require
In the wake of Venezuela’s ongoing political turmoil, the specter of regime change looms large, echoing the historical events of over 80 years ago when Rómulo Betancourt led a successful coup against a dictatorship to establish what would become known as Venezuelan democracy. Betancourt’s initial attempts at governance were marred by challenges such as a weak state reliant on oil revenue and a military uneasy with partisan politics, leading to his ousting in 1948. However, his later commitment to sharing power with other political factions laid the groundwork for a more enduring democratic framework, a stark contrast to the current situation under Nicolás Maduro, whose regime has been characterized by authoritarianism and rampant corruption. The recent rise of opposition leader María Corina Machado, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has rekindled discussions of overthrowing Maduro, with support from the Trump administration, which has taken aggressive measures including military posturing and sanctions aimed at facilitating regime change.
The complexities of ousting Maduro extend beyond mere political will; they delve into the intricate landscape of Venezuelan society and governance, which has deteriorated significantly under years of mismanagement. Maduro’s regime has presided over the world’s worst economic collapse in peacetime, with a staggering 75% contraction of the economy leading to widespread poverty and an exodus of nearly 8 million citizens. While Machado’s vision for a post-Maduro Venezuela includes rapid economic recovery through privatization and foreign investment, the reality is that the institutions necessary for a stable democracy have eroded. With the military entrenched in power and facing potential legal repercussions for their actions, the prospect of a smooth transition remains uncertain.
The lessons from Venezuela’s past underscore the challenges of establishing a sustainable democracy. As seen with Betancourt’s initial struggles and eventual successes, the transition from dictatorship to democracy requires not only the removal of the current regime but also the rebuilding of a capable state apparatus that can protect civil liberties and foster political order. The current political landscape is rife with armed militias, rampant corruption, and a judiciary that lacks independence, making the task of state-building a daunting and lengthy endeavor. Should regime change occur, the new government would have to navigate the complexities of reestablishing trust and functionality within the state while addressing the immediate needs of a population weary from years of hardship. The path forward for Venezuela, therefore, hinges not just on the removal of Maduro, but on a comprehensive strategy for rebuilding the very foundations of democracy itself.
A little more than 80 years ago, a group of young military officers joined with Venezuela’s main opposition party to overthrow the country’s ruling dictator. The man who took power, Rómulo Betancourt, became known as the father of Venezuelan democracy. He quickly set to work expanding suffrage, carrying out social and economic reforms, securing oil revenue, and settling European refugees who had fled World War II.
Betancourt inherited a weak state, reliant on oil revenue, that had nominal institutions and limited experience with democracy. He stacked the government with partisans; other political parties cried foul; and the military got nervous. A coup toppled his government in 1948, and democracy would not reemerge in Venezuela for another decade. By then Betancourt had learned his lesson: He shared power with other major parties, a move that allowed democracy to take root and endure for decades, until its erosion and then collapse under Hugo Chávez after 1999.
Today there is again talk of regime change in Venezuela. The country’s popular opposition leader, the recent Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado,
calls
President Nicolás Maduro’s rule illegitimate and promises to return the country to democracy. The Trump administration seems inclined to act on her behalf. The administration
cut off
dialogue with the Maduro regime earlier this month. It then ramped up air strikes against alleged drug-trafficking boats off Venezuela’s coast and
offered
a $50 million bounty for information that could be used to arrest Maduro. Meanwhile, Donald Trump has massed thousands of U.S. troops, warships, and other military assets off the Venezuelan coast and
authorized
covert CIA action on the ground. Officials
privately concede
that these moves are part of an effort to force Maduro from office.
[
Read: Why Venezuela?
]
Unseating an existing regime is hard enough; building a new one to replace it is even more bedeviling. Both Venezuelan and American history is stocked with cautionary tales of regime-change operations gone awry. In today’s Venezuela, the military is dug into power and faces considerable risk if Maduro is ousted. It will be an obstacle to his removal—and even if such an operation succeeds, reestablishing democracy afterward will be very difficult.
For an outside power to topple Maduro would be a violation of international law and of Venezuela’s sovereignty. But the humanitarian and political case for doing so is compelling on its face. The Venezuelan leader has ravaged his country’s economy, causing it to
shrink
by an incredible 75 percent—the world’s worst economic collapse in peacetime. The resulting poverty, misery, and health crises have driven
nearly 8 million people
, almost a quarter of the country’s population, to emigrate. That has destabilized politics and fueled right-wing reactions against immigration across the hemisphere. Amid this wreckage, Maduro blatantly
stole
the country’s most recent presidential election and forcibly cracked down on the political opposition. His regime is deeply unpopular, corrupt, and authoritarian.
Despite the escalating threats, Maduro and his military allies have steadfastly refused to step aside. For good reason: They may face severe consequences if they do.
Years ago, Venezuela’s military could have plausibly sought an off-ramp from dictatorship through amnesties and constitutional protections that would afford its members a future under democratic rule. But such an arrangement is unlikely today. Maduro and several of his high-ranking military officials have been
charged
with narco-terrorism, drug trafficking, and other crimes in American courts. If they are captured, they could end up jailed for life, much as Panamanian President
Manuel Noriega
and several of his associates did in 1989. Maybe Venezuela’s military elite could find a way to remain in the country—but then its years of mismanagement and human-rights violations would likely catch up with it, making it the target of an incoming government’s retribution.
If any faction of the military is likely to move against Maduro, it would probably emerge among lower-ranking officers who don’t face the same risks as the top brass. Indeed, some such factions joined a failed uprising against Maduro led by Juan Guaidó in 2019. But
U.S. sanctions
,
pressure
for political opening, and even a Guaidó-led
parallel government
failed to peel the military away from Maduro.
Still, suppose that a coterie of low-ranking military defectors gathers sufficient momentum to depose Maduro, or that the Trump administration authorizes military action: What would replace the Maduro regime, and how?
The political opposition, largely united under Machado’s leadership, promises a new dawn for democracy. Machado has
described
a pathway to rapid economic recovery through privatization, foreign investment, market liberalization, and macroeconomic and regulatory reform. Her vision calls for an influx of capital to rebuild the country’s broken health and education systems, and for investment in much-needed infrastructure improvements that could attract emigrants back to the country to help rebuild.
The plan is alluring, but democracy works only if institutions function and the civil liberties of citizens can be protected. That in turn requires a capable state apparatus and a degree of political order. Both have
crumbled
in Venezuela under Maduro and his predecessor, Chávez. Armed citizen militias,
criminal governance
, and illicit economies have mushroomed across the country as the state has been hollowed out. The government has completely
upended
the foundations of property rights, making secure investment nearly impossible.
Corruption
and
black markets
abound; even state agents participate in them regularly. The currency has little intrinsic value.
[
Read: The U.S. is preparing for war in Venezuela
]
Against that backdrop, the institutions of government have withered. The judiciary is fully
packed
with pliable political allies of the ruling regime. The election authority and Congress are stacked with regime allies and no longer perform their most basic functions. Even local government, which remained somewhat competitive under Chávez and for a time under Maduro, has been undermined, as tax collection has
plummeted
and revenue sharing has dried up because of the economic contraction.
The Venezuelan state needs to be rebuilt almost from the ground up. That’s a yearslong endeavor, and a new democracy would have to manage the expectations of citizens against the slow and rocky reality of state-building. In the meantime, it would have to contend with the gangs, criminal networks, and other powerful armed actors that have grown used to exercising local control. Even more Venezuelans may decide to migrate if they believe that opportunity is not being regenerated quickly enough, or if the state cannot rein in social violence.
Venezuela’s first democratic revolution in 1948 and its subsequent democratic transition in 1958 hold lessons for today’s proponents of regime change: Establishing a durable democracy is far harder than unseating a dictator.
